The Fog of War: Eylau Dawn
Military history books require good maps. Among our thirty-seven maps are grand tactical depictions so you can see the battlefield as perceived by the rival commanders. Generals on both sides made decisions based on incomplete information. Their ability to cope with the 'Fog of War' helped determine a battle's outcome.
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On page 271, Map 23 Russian Initial Dispositions, Eylau Dawn, February 8, 1807, we see how Bennigsen's perception of French dispositions influenced his deployment. Only those French units that Bennigsen could see are shown. Based on what he could see, Bennigsen concluded that Napoleon intended to attack his right in order to drive a wedge between the Russian army and the Prussians who were operating to the northwest. Accordingly, Bennigsen weighted his defense on his right. Click on map for larger view |
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On page 277, Map 25 French Initial Dispositions, Eylau Dawn, February 8, 1807, we see Napoleon's actual dispositions. Contrary to Bennigsen's assessment, Napoleon planned to shift Augereau's VII Corps to the French right-center to conduct a pinning attack against the Russian left. This attack was supposed to commence when Davout entered the field from the southeast to make a battle-winning grand tactical envelopment of the Russian flank. In the event, the battle did not proceed according to either general's intentions. Click on map for larger view |
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The Strategic
We provide thirty-seven maps so you can follow the strategic situation as perceived by the rival commanders. Both Napoleon and Bennigsen had to make decisions based on incomplete and often misleading intelligence. This 'Fog of War' hugely influenced the campaign's outcome.
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On page 233, Map 17 Napoleon's Pursuit, February 5-6, 1807, we see Napoleon's strategic scheme and how his mistaken notion of the location of Bernadotte's I Corps affected his plans. Click on map for larger view |
The Tactical
Many of our maps depict the unfolding tactical situation at the regimental level. In addition, we explain and evaluate French and Russian combat tactics.
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On page 273, Map 24 Bennigsen's Tactical Deployment, we see Bennigsen's novel tactical scheme to thwart a French infantry assault. The regiments closest to the French deployed two battalions in line. One hundred paces behind them stood the third battalions formed in column. Their task was to seal any breaches by a quick counterattack. The regiments in the second line provided Bennigsen with part of his 'strong reserves at hand'. They formed in regimental columns of battalions (each battalion deployed in line, one behind the other). This formation had two advantages. If the French infantry defeated all the front units, they would still face a fresh battalion deployed in a defensive formation. Secondly, the regimental columns of battalions could easily form march columns and redeploy where needed. Click on map for larger view |
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